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ABSTRACT
'Recent àdvancès tn financiat theory hive created an understanding, of the
'énv1ronmentsin which .a real security cant be synthesized by'I dynamic trading
3.. H...•'. strategy inarisk free asset and other securities. We contend. that there is
a'crucialdistinction between a lynthetic security and a real security. In particular
the notion that a real security is redundant when it' can be synthesized by a
'dynamic trAding'strategy Ignores" the: infoirmati onal role of rSal "securities markets.'
The replacement of a real security by synthetic strategies may.in' itself cause
enough uncertainty"about the priëe volatility of the' underlying secUrity, that
the real security is no longer redundant.
Portfol to iniurance provides, a 'good. éxanqle of 'the 'difference between a
synthetic security and a real security. One fonn. of portfolio insurance uses
atrading strategy in risk' free *ecuritià"(Mcash"), arid Indexfutures to synthesize
...a'Eui'opeanput on the underlying'portfolio.' In 'the 'Abténce 'of a real,'traded
ptitoptidn (of the appropriate striking p'riàe,andmaturity) there 1111 be less
'tnlonnation ibout the future price volatility associated withcurrent dynamic
hedging strategies. There will thus be less information transmitted to those
people who could make capital available to liquidity providers. It will therefore
be more difficult for the market to absorb the trades implied by the dynannc
hedging strategies. In-effect, 'the stockil..:future•:p.rjce:: volatility 'can rise









The introduction of futures and options markets in stock
indexes is strongly associated with the use of programmed
trading strategies.Such strategies are used for spot/futures
arbitrage, market timing, and portfolio insurance. It is this
last use of programmed trading strategies that raises
fascinating theoretical questions, the answers to which may have
practical importance for understanding the impact of such
strategies on the volatility of stock and futures prices.
Recent advances in financial theory have created an
understandingof the environments inwhicha real security can
besynthesized by a dynamic trading strategy in a risk free
asset and other securities. 1 'rhe proliferation of new
securities has beenmade possible, in part, by this theoretical
work. 'The issuer of a new security canpricethe security based
on its ability to synthesize thereturnsstream of the new
security using a dynamic trading strategy in existing
securities, futures and options.ThisUSeofdynamic trading
strategieshasbeenextended even further by eliminating the
"new" security altogether andjust selling the dynamic hedging
strategydirectly.Portfoi:Lo insurance is the best example of
thelatter phenomenon.
Herein we contend that there is a crucial distinction
The seminal contribution is the Black—Scholes (1973)
option pricing approach, whereby it is shown how a dynamic
trading strategy in a stock and risk free asset can reproduce a
European call or put option on the stock.—2—
between a synthetic security and a real security. In particular
the notion that a real security is redundant when it can be
synthesized by a dynamic trading strategy ignores the
informational role of real securities markets,2 The prices of
real securities convey important information to market
participants, and this information will not be conveyed if the
real security is replaced by synthetic trading strategies. In
particular the replacement of a real security by synthetic
strategies may in itself cause enough uncertainty about the
price volatility of the underlying security that the real
security is no longer redundant.
Portfolio insurance provides a good example of the
difference between a synthetic security and a real security.
One form of portfolio insurance uses a trading strategy in risk
free securities ("cash") and index futures to synthesize a
European put on the underlying portfolio. If a put was traded
on a securities market, then the price of the put would reveal
important information about the desire of people to sell stock
consequent to adverse future price moves.3For example, if
everyone in the economy would like to get out of stocks before
the price falls by more than 25%, then the price of such a put
option would be very high.If only a few holders of stocks
2 See Grossman (1977)for an elaboration of the
informational role of securities and futures prices.
Throughout this paper "stock" is often used
interchangeably with "stock index" to represent a portfolio of
risky assets.-.3 —
desiredsuch protection then the put option's market price would
be low. The put's price thus reveals information about the
fraction of people with plans to get out of (or into) stocks in
the future,The put's price reveals the extent to which the
strategies of people can cohere in the future.By showing
people the true cost of their planes it may discourage people
from attempting to purchase too much insurance in exactly those
circumstances when the dynamic hedging strategy would raise
stock price volatility.4
All of the above informational consequences of trading in a
real security are absent if the real security is replaced by
dynamic hedging strategies alone.How does a purchaser of a
given strategy (such as a synthetic put) know the cost of
insurance? Surely the cost depends on how many other people are
planning to carry out similar stock selling and purchasing plans
in the future. What mechanism exists to aggregate across people
the information about future trading plans which will determine
the cost of the current insurance strategy?
The marketing of strategies rather than securities has far
reaching implications for the volatility of the underlying stock
and futures markets. There is no market force or price
information which ensures that stratecUes can be implemented, or
which informs the user of the total cost of implementation. In
The cost of the strategy is the potential upside gains
that are foregone to protect against downside losses.If the
stock volatility is high then this cost will be high.We will
argue below that the volatility will be higher the larger is the
number of investors using portfolio insurance strategies.—4—
contrast, the purchaser of a knows the cost of his
purchase. For the economy as a whole, the price of the
reflects the cost of implementing the dynamic hedging strategy
to which it may be equivalent. More importantly, the existence
of a traded security will aggregate information (regarding
future trading plans) which is currently dispersed among
investors? and hence provide valuable information about the cost
of implementing the strategy
The current price of a traded security also reveals
information to people who can currently plan to take liquidity
providing positions in the future to offset the position changes
implied by portfolio insurance strategies. For example, when a
put option price is high, this reveals information that stock
price volatility is high.Market makers, market timers, and
other liquidity providers are thus informed that the future
holds good opportunities for them. This leads them to make more
capital available in the future to be used to take advantage of
the stock price volatility.Of course, this will have the
effect of reducing the actual volatility, since a lot of capital
will be present to invest to take advantage of excessive price
moves.
In the absence of a real traded put option (of the
appropriate striking price and maturity), there will be less
information about the future price volatility associated with—5—
current dynamic hedging strategies.5 There will thus be less
information transmitted to those people who could make capital
available to liquidity providers.It will therefore be more
difficult for the market to absorb the trades implied by the
dynamic hedging strategies. In effect, the stocks' future price
volatility can rise because of a current lack of information
about the extent to which dynamic hedging strategies are in
place.
These points are elaborated in this paper as follows.
Section 2 presents a schematic model of the impact of portfolio
insurance on the stock and futures markets. Section 3 discusses
the strategies used by investors who use synthetic hedging
strategies, and by market timers whose capital commitments can
offset the effects of portfolio insurance. Section 4 develops a
model of market equilibrium in a context where the number of
users of dynamic hedging strategies is not known to all market
participants.Section 5 discusses potential adaptations which
may be useful to organized Exchanges in case the growth in the
use of synthetic sectrities raises the information requirements
necessary to maintain stable markets in the underlying
securities.
In the Black -Scholesmodel, the volatility is assumed
constant, so that an option of any strike price and maturity can
be used to infer the volatility of the stock.Clearly, the
situation considered here is one where the volatility is not
constant, This is elaborated below.2. IHOPGANIZATION OF THE MODEL
The purpose the this and the next two Sections is to
provide a schematic model of the informational consequences of
trading strategies which are designed to create synthetic
securities.We wish to elaborate the idea that market timers
must commit capital before they know the extent of usage, and
the future price impact of the implementation of these
strategies. This incomplete information will lessen their
effectiveness in reducing the price volatility which can be
caused when large portfolio insurance induced trades take place.
One purpose of the model to be developed below is to show
that as the importance of portfolio insurance grows, then the
price impact problem will also grow unless there is some
mechanism by which the market can be informed in advance of the
trades. The current market impact issues are minuscule relative
to what would occur if 50% of the pension fund asset managers
were to choose strategies designed to protect themselves against
a loss on their stock portfolios.In order to minimize the
market impact of such strategies, those who could provide
substantial amounts of liquidity to the market would have to be
informed substantially in advance so that they could choose not
to commit their capital to other activities,In what follows
the length of time between date 1 and date 2 represents the
amount of time that market timers and other liquidity providers
would have to avoid committing their capital to other activities
so that this capital can support the purchase or sale ofsecurities in response to temporary price moves caused by the
execution of portfolio insurance strategies.
It may help the reader to have a real example of the
phenomenon under study. Such an example is the use of "sunshine
trading" strategies in Stock Index Futures by the brokers for
portfolio insurers (see Kidder, Peabody & Co.(1986)). A broker
using the sunshine trading technique announces to the brokerage
and investment community that after a fixed period of time large
orders will be brought to the trading floor and auctioned off at
the best price. The purpose of preannounced trading is to give
the investment community time to bring "market timing capital",
or to bring the orders of customers who want the other side of
the trade, to the Exchange trading floor so that the execution
of a large order will not cause an adverse price move.6
The simplest model which can bring out the distinction
between real securities and synthetic securities has three
trading dates:
At date 1, some fraction f of security holders choose a dynamic
hedging strategy, At the same time market makers, market timers
and other liquidity providers (who I will henceforth group
together under the title of market timers) decide how much
capital to set aside for their attempts to profit from temporary
price movements.
At date 2, news arrives about the underlying worth of the stock
portfolio. This triggers trades based upon the date 1 portfolio
dynamic hedging strategy. The price change caused by the
6 This phenomenon shows that not only are portfolio
insurers concerned about the price impact of their trades, but
that they feel that the release of information before a trade
can bring forth capital (and offsetting customer order flow) to
enhance the liquidity of the market.—8—
execution of the trades will depend on the amount of capital set
aside at date 2 for market timing activity. It may be helpful
to imagine that there are two possible prices at date 2, 2g and mdependingon whether good or bad news about fundamentals
arrives at date 2. The (market clearing) prices at which trades
can be executed will depend on f as well as market timing
capital (denoted by M) available at date 2. We denote this
dependence by writing P2g(f,M) and 2b =P2b(f,N).
At date 3 the stock price returns to its normal level which
reflects the underlying fundamental value of holding the stock
portfolio.The normal level at date 3 depends on information
about fundamentals which arrives at date 3.It may be helpful
to imagine that there are two possible prices at date 3, Pg and
3b depending on whether good or bad news about fundamentals
arrives at date 3. Of course, the news about fundamentals which
arrived at date 2 will be relevant for determining the level of
possible date 3 prices, and we capture this by writing
P3(2g), if good news at date 3 was preceded by good news at
date 2, or =P3(2g)if bad news at date 3 was preceded by
good news at date 2, and similarly for other combinations of
date 2 and date 3 news.
Since we are focusing on the informational consequences of
the substitution of synthetic securities for real securities, we
assume that f is uncertain, i.e., a random variable, A summary
of the resolution of uncertainty follows:
Date 1: A realization f occurs which is not public information.
Date 2: News about fundamentals arrives publicly prior to
trade. The dynamic hedging strategy chosen at Date 1 is
implemented.
Date 3: News about fundamentals arrives publicly prior to
trade. Price is determined fully by fundamentals7.
For expositional simplicity, at this stage in the analysis
we ignore transaction costs and the distinction between futures
and spot transactions in the underlying stock portfolio.The
7 Date 3is a theoretical device to tie down the
equilibrium. The time between date 2 and date 3 is the length
of time necessary for the temporary price impact of the date 2
trades to disappear. That is, the expected return from holding
stocks from date 3 forward would be uncorrelated with the date 2
news event.—9—
purpose of the model is to show how incomplete information at
date 1 about the fraction f of portfolio managers using
synthetic option strategies can leave market timers unprepared
at date 2 to offset the trades of portfolio hedgers, and that
this causes the date 2 stock price to be more volatile than it
would have been had real put options been traded at date i8 We
begin by explaining the behavior of each of the types of
traders, and then analyze how the behavior determines market
clearing prices.
8 It should be emphasized that there may be incomplete
information about more than just the fraction of investor
capital managed with the use of portfolio insurance strategies.
There may also be incomplete information about the type of
strategy used, e.g. there can be incomplete information about
the horizon, and/or strike price of the implicit put options
being used.We focus on incomplete information about f, for
expositional simplicity alone.The basic principle would be
unaffected by more complex types of incomplete information.—10—
3 IQI STRATEGIESUTILIZED
3A. A cET_ARSMARKET TIMERS[D oTHER_LIQUIDITySTJppRS
Atdate 1 members of this group must decide how much
capital to commit to activities which would leave their capital
unavailable for market timing at date 2.That is, at date 1
capital can be committed or invested in activities for which it
would be very costly or impossible to withdraw the funds anduse
it tocapitalizemarket making transactions at date 2.For
example if a pension fund invests some of its capital in
mortgages, then it will be very costly for it to sell these
mortgages at short notice to use its capital to take advantage
of a market timing opportunity, Similarly, an investment bank
may commit its capital to financing various activities other
than market timing.These date 1 commitments of capital to
activities for which there is a large cost of withdrawal at date
2 will lessen the funds available for date 2 markettiming
activities.
How much capital will firms make available for market
timing activities? Clearly, this depends on the date 1 expected
reward from taking market timing positions at date 2.We now
argue that this date 1 expected reward will be higher the larger
is the volatility of date 2 expected stock returns around the
normal expected return, For example, if market timers at date 1
knew for certain that the expected return at date 2 for holding
the stock from date 2 to date 3 would equal the normal return
for holding the risk associated with the stock fundamentals,—11—
then they would have no particular incentive at date 1 to commit
capital to date 2 market timing activities.
The above point can be clarified by reference to the
situation where there is either good or bad news about
fundamentals. Suppose that at date 2 the two possible prices in
the absence of parties using portfolio insurance would be P2g*
and P2b*. These numbers have the property that portfolio owners
would be willing to hold their existing stock levels
anticipating a random return of P3/P2b* computed from the bad
news of date 2 to date 3, and P3/P2g* computed from the good
news at date 2 to date 39 Suppose that the implementation of
dynamic hedging strategies will cause the date 2 price to be
lower than P2b* in the bad news state, and higher than P2g* in
the good news state.Since by assumption, date 3 is a point
where prices are driven by fundamentals, this implies that the
expected return as of the date 2 good news state (for holding
the stock until date 3) will be lower than the normal expected
return, and the expected return in the date 2 bad news state
will be higher than the normal expected return. In the date 2
bad news state the market timers will make a net expected reward
by increasing their stock holding, and in the date 2 good news
state they will make an expected reward by decreasing their
holdings (possibly taking a short position).
The above argument shows that the market timing rewards
Throughout the paper, a price with a state subscript
absent represents a random variable.will be high the larger is above P2g*, and the smaller is
2b below P2b*, This is precisely the statement that the larger
is the excess volatility in the date 2 prices, thelarger will
be the expectation as of date 1 that rewards can be made from
market timing activity at date 2.Thus given that there is a
real opportunity cost of committing funds for market timing
activities, a higher date 2 excess price volatility will bring
forth more market timing capital. This supply curve for market
timing capital will be denoted by M(V), where V is the excess
volatility of date 2 prices, as anticipated at date l.Note
that by definition M includes the possibility of leverage. That
is, M gives the absolute value of the dollar size of the
position that the market timer can take at date 2.
It is now possible to describe the trading activity of
market timers at date 2. The fraction of M(V) which is invested
will depend on P2/P2*, When that ratio is small (and less than
1) a larger proportion of M(V) will be invested, but by
definition never more than 100%.Similarly, when P2/P2* is
large (and larger than 1) up to M(V) dollars worth of the stocks
will be sold.10
When market clearing prices at date 2 are generated, it
will be shown that the market timers trading strategy serves a
stabilizing function. If at date ithe market timers know that
10 This is a crudedescription of the extent to which date
1 commitments enable date 2 trades. Our argument requires only
that the size of market timers' trades at date 2is an
increasing function of the volatility they anticipated as of
date 1.—1.3—
there is going to be dat.3 2 volatility, then they will commit
capital to be used at date 2 to buy stocks when the price is
lower than its normal level, and to sell stocks when the price
is above its normal level.This argument relies crucially on
the hypothesis that market timers know the date 2 volatility at
date 1. We will see that if volatility is generated by the use
of synthetic securities, then this volatility will be larger the
larger is the fraction of portfolio managers (f) at date 1 who
commit to a dynamic hedging strategy. To the extent that market
timers do not know f at the time they choose M, they will find
it difficult to forecast volatility.
In the absence of perfect information about volatility,
market timers will choose an M that is optimal for some average
level of volatility, denoted by Ma.In situations where the
volatility V is high, Ma will be less than M(V). In situations
where V is low, Ma will be higher than M(V).Therefore the
stabilizing role of market timers will be impeded by imperfect
information about the determinants of price volatility.
38. BUY AND HOLD PORTFOLIO MANAGERS
These parties do not follow dynamic hedging strategies. In
particular, their risk preferences are such that, at prices P2g*
and P2b*, they would keep their portfolio unchanged at date 2 in
response to the date 2 news about fundamentals. In particular
when f 0, the whole market is composed of people with these
risk preferences and P2* gives the price at which the expected—14—
returns from holding stock are such thata buy and hold strategy
(from date 1 to date 3) is optimal.
We are making a slightly artificial distinctionbetween
market timers and those following passive investmentstrategies.
In general, if P2 is less than p2*, then investorswho planned
to have a passive strategy as of date1, may find a high
expected return to increasing their investment in risky assets.
Thus, this group may also serve a market timing function,
However, it is our assumption that their response totemporary
price moves is much smaller than market timers.This is
because, their portfolio objective specifies a particular
fraction of plioya1ue to be invested in therisky asset,
and a fall in price gives them a lower portfolio value.Thus
even in the face of higher expected returnsper unit risk, these
investors need not increase significantly theirholdings of
risky assets due to the fall in their portfolio value whenP2 is
less than p2*,
3 C. YNTTTCSEIESpOFOLoINUREpS
An investoruses a dynamic trading strategy in market
contexts where the securities which would generate his desired
pattern of returns across states of nature are unavailable,11
This is a statement about the risk preferences and information
of the investor, the risk preferences and informationof the
See Leland (1980), and Benninga and Blume (1985) foran
analysis of the sources of demand for portfolio insurance,—15--
other market participants, as well about the number of explicit
securities marketed. Trivially, if all investors were
identical, then they would all choose buy and hold strategies in
the market index portfolio. On the other hand if investors are
sufficiently diverse, the only situation in which market
equilibrium will involve all traders choosing buy and hold
strategies at date 1 in real securities is if the market is
explicitly complete, i.e., for every state s3, there exists a
portfolio of securities which when held to date 3 gives $1 if
and only if state s3 occurs (or equivalently, if European
options at all possible striking prices are marketed, where some
of the striking prices may have to depend on the history which
leads up to the final payoff if investors desire path dependent
final payoffs).
Our securities and futures markets allow an investor to
achieve a middle ground between the above extremes, Investors
may well be sufficiently diverse that a buy and hold strategy in
a stock index, is not optimal for everyone, however markets are
not sufficiently complete that a buy and hold strategy in a risk
free security and an option with the investor's desired striking
price is marketed.The investor may still be able to achieve
the same outcome (or close to it), by using a dynamic trading
strategy to keJ the desired security.12
Consider the following very simple example.Suppose that
12 See Cox and Rubinstein (1985) for an exposition of
dynamic trading strategies which synthesize options and other
contingent claims.—16—
the stock price is $10 at date 1, and at date 2 it either rises
or falls from its date 1 level by 10%. Suppose further that the
at date 3 the stock price can either rise of fall from its date
2 level by 10%. Thus there are three possible date 3 prices
$8.1, $9.9, and $12.1. Let the investor start will 100 shares,
and assume that the risk free interest rate is 0%. Suppose that
the investor's preferences are such that he wants to get the
highest expected date 3 wealth subject to the constraints that:
(a) his date 3 wealth is no lower than $900, and (b) he is
allowed
asset. If the expected return on the stock is higher thanthat
ofthe risk free asset, then it can be shown that the optimal
trading strategy for the investor is to (i) invest all of his
date 1 wealth in the risky asset (i.e., buy 100 shares at date
1)(ii)if the price at date 2 is $9, then he sells all 100
shares and invests in the risk free asset; (iii) if the price at
date 2 is $11, then he simply holds on to his 100 shares.
Notice that the above strategy makes the holdings of the
risky asset very volatile. A high expected return is achieved
(subject to the constraint that the portfolio have a terminal
value no lower than $900) by a high initial investment in risky
assets supported by a plan to sell off all stocks at date 2if
the price falls. This is an extreme form of portfolio
insurance. A plan which did not involve the sale of all stocks
at date 2 in the event of a price fall would require a smaller
initial investment in the risky asset, and have lower expected—17—
returns.
The strategy also has the property that the final payoff
to the strategy is path dependent (i.e., the strategy has a
different payoff when the price reaches $9.9 at date 3 by first
reaching $9 at date 2, than would be the case if $9.9 is reached
form $11 at date 2).For some reason many portfolio insurers
avoid the use of such path dependent strategies even though they
yield a higher expected return for the same level of
insurance. 13
A strategy used by many portfolio insurers is a path
independent one where a dynamic trading strategy is chosen which
replicates the payoff which would derive from investing an
amount of $S in the stock and buying a put with a striking price
of $900.14 The value for S is found by noting that the cost of
the put plus the investment in the stock S must equal the date I
value of the portfolio which in the above example is $1000.
This strategy has the same qualitative property as the one given
above: the risky asset is sold if the date 2 price is lower than
the date 1 price. However the path of holdings in the stock is
somewhat different: all of the portfolio is not invested in the
risky asset at date 1, and all of the risky assetis not sold
13 The replication of such strategies in a complete market
would require trading in real securities for which a buyand
hold strategy would yield a path dependent payoff.
14 See Rubinstein (1985), and Brennan and Schwartz (1987)
for a discussion of these strategies.—18—
off at date 2 if the price falls)-5
Another form of portfolio insurance, called constant
proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) moves the investment in
the risky asset linearly with how much higher the value of the
portfolio is than the insurance level ($900 in the above
example),16 This trading strategy also has the property that a
fall in the stock price will lead the investor to reduce his
holdings of risky assets,
In summary, the users of portfolio insurance will tend to
have demands for stocks that are more price sensitive than those
investors utilizing buy and hold strategies.
15 68.97 shares of the stockare held at date 1, and if the
price falls then 34.48 shares are held at date 2, while if the
price rises then 97.18 shares are held at date 2.
16 See Black and Jones(1986), and Perold (1986) for a
discussion of this strategy.—19—
4. MAPI<ETEQUILIBRIUM
In this Section we tie the strategies of various investors
together for the purpose of analyzing market equilibrium.We
will analyze 3 cases. In the first case market timers at date 1
know the extent to which dynamic hedging strategies are being
used. In the second case, market timers do not know the extent
to which such strategies are being used but real put options are
traded at date 1. In the third case, market timers do not know
the extent to which dynamic hedging strategies are being used
and there are insufficient real index options markets to convey
this information,
4A. EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF DYNAMIC HEDGING STRATEGIES IS KNOWN
For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case where
there are two possible public news announcements about
fundamentals at both date 2 and date 3. Hence a model of market
clearing involves finding a date 1 price P1, and a date 2 price
for each announcement 2g' 2b such that the securities market
clears at each date and state. It is clear that if the fraction
f of investors using dynamic hedging strategies is known (and
the types of strategies being used are also known), then it will
be possible for all parties to forecast the volatility of date 2
prices, and hence there will be prices P1, Pg, and m such
that if all traders anticipate these prices, and if the dynamic
hedging strategies are indeed feasible at these prices, then the
stock market will clear at those prices.—20—
Market Clearinci at Date 2
The above remarks may be slightly clarified by the use of
the following notation:
Let X(P2/P2*,M;N) be the demand function of market timers at
date 2, thought of as a function of the price P2 relative to its
normal level, the capital which they can commit M, and the
public news about fundamentals N. As we noted earlier, if P2 =
then they demand no shares. As P2 falls relative to the
2* which is appropriate for the information N, they increase
their holdings.
The demand function of the buy and hold investors is also a
function Y(P2/P2*;N) of the price relative to its normal level.
However unlike the market timers, for the reasons given above,
this demand will not be very sensitive to price changes. In the
extreme case of a buy and hold investor, it will be totally
insensitive, We assume that if P2 =p2*,then I =100%.That
is, if the market was composed only of buy and hold investors,
then these investors would demand 100% of the outstanding shares
of stock.
The desired holdings of those investors who are using a dynamic
hedging strategy is Z(P2;N). Their desired holdings of shares
will fall as P2 falls.There may even be a critical level
beyond which they desire to hold no shares.
Given the news N, a market clearing price P2 will satisfy:
(1)X(P2/P2*,M;N) +(l—f)Y(P2/P2*;N)+(f)Z(P2;N) 100%
This is the statement that P2 will adjust until 100% of the
outstanding stock is held by those people who, at price P2, no
longer desire to trade, We write the market clearing price as a
function of f, and N : P2P2(f,N). Note that if f=0, so that
no dynamic hedgers are present, then the market clearing price
will be P2*. This means that if good news arrives then P2=P2g*,
and if bad news arrives then P2=P2b*.The difference between
P2g* and P2b* gives a measure of the normal level of volatility
in the market.
Now consider the case where f>0, so dynamic hedgers areus2l..
present. Xn such a situation when bad news arrives, the market
will no longer clear at P2b*. This is because the demand of the
hedgers is lower than the demand of the buy and hold investors
at P2b*. Market clearing will require a price lower than P2b*.
How much lower depends on the impact of market timers.If
markettimers have a very large presence in the market, i.e., K
is very large, then even a very small deviation of P2 from 2*
willcause large trades by market timers. On the other hand if
Kis small then itwill take a large deviation of P2 from P2* to
clearthe market when f is large.
Xn ramary if V denotes the volatility of date 2 prices in
response to news about fundamentals, then V will depend on f and
K, which we write as V(f,M). Volatility will rise with f and
fall with K.
Market deanna at Date 1
The above analysis of the market at date 2 can be used to
analyze the behavior of market participants at date 1. Under
the assumption that f is known at date 1, the market timers will
be able to infer the volatility of date 2 prices, and hence
their potential benefits from committing resources, K to market
timing activities. In particular, the function V(f,M) generates
an aggregate demand for market timing services (which we denote
by Mdlv; f) ),sinceit implies a particular return to date 1
investments in obtaining capital commitments for the purpose of
date 2 market timing activities. As we noted earlier there aree22e
costsof obtaining market timing capital. These costs generate
a supply curve for market timing capital M, denoted by Ms CV).
The intersection of these twocurves(i.e., the M such that M
Md(V;f) —M5(V)) will generate an M and a V which depend on f,
denoted respectively by M(f) and V(f).
The less costly it is 'to commit capital to market timing
activities, the larger will be ).fora 'given level of f. That
is, the more it will be the case that the demands of market
timers offset the demands of investors using dynamic hedging
strategies. Thus, date 2 price volatility V —V(f)—V(f,M(f))
will be low if it is not costly to commit capital to market
timing activities at date 1.
The Feasibility of Portfolio Insurance
Finally, M determines the feasibility of certain types of
portfolio insurance. Recall that M determines the level of the
date 2 price in the presence àf bad news about fundamentals,
2b An insurer would not be able to offer a dynamic strategy
which aisured a price higher than 2b In the event that bad
news arrives at date 2 the joint execution of all the portfolio
insurance strategies will force the.. price down to 2b' 50
insurers would not be able to execute: stop loss orders at a
price higher than 2b Of course, if it is knownatdate 1 that
markettimer presence willbe large at date 2, then it will be
possibleto offer'insurance at'levels almost as high as P2b*,
since 2b will be almost as high is P2b*.—23—
4B. EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF DYNAMIC HEDGING STRATEGIES IS UNKNOWN,
BUT REAL PUT OPTIONS ARE TRADED AT DATE 1.
The previous analysis was predicated on the notion that the
degree of date 2 price volatility was known at date 1.If this
is not known then it will difficult, if not impossible for
market makers to know the benefits of their date 1 capital
commitments, and for date 1 insurers to know that their date 2
trading strategy can be implemented. This is exactly the type
of situation where a real put options market may have a very
important role,
If portfolio insurers implement their strategies via the
purchase of put optthns at date 1, then the price of put options
will reveal the fraction of investors who are using portfolio
insurance strategies. Since the price of the put is a function
of the anticipated volatility of the stock, the price will
equivalently reveal the volatility of the stock.
To understand the ability of prices to aggregate
information, imagine that a fraction f of investors decides to
use portfolio insurance, and in a market where this is known, a
volatility V(f) would be implied. This in turn would imply a
particular date 1 price for the put, say Q(V(f)) =Q(f).Now
suppose that traders do not know what the volatility will be
because they do not know f.Suppose, for example that this
leads to a put price below Q(f). Could this really represent a
market equilibrium? It could not, because the users of dynamic
hedging strategies would find it cheaper to use real puts to
execute their trades than synthetic strategies, and this would—24—
drive up the put price.A similar argument obtains on the
downside when the put price is higher than Q(f).It would then
be optimal for some portfolio insurer to sell puts and cover
this sale with a dynamic hedging strategy.17 In the terminology
of Grossman (1976), the put price is a sufficient statistic for
the one dimensional variable V.
After all investors have learned the information about the
stock's volatility from observing the option price, the option
can indeed be a redundant security (in the sense that its date 2
and date 3 value can be replicated using a dynamic hedging
strategy in the risk free asset and the stock). However, since
the option is not informationally redundant, the volatility of
stock prices can be substantially lower in an economy where real
options are traded than it would be in an economy in which
17Theabove argument is true for situations where a given
investor knows that his decision to use a portfolio insurance
strategy is correlated with the decision of others, and
therefore each investor has a little information about the
overall fraction of users.The reader may wonder what would
happen if each user of portfolio insurance did not know how many
others are using it, and thus he would not know the volatility.
This is irrelevant in a situation where the only variable which
affects the put price is the volatility. In order for the put
price to be below Q(V), a substantial portion of the market must
expect a volatility lower than V. A price below Q(V), say Q1
would be consistent with a lower volatility than V, say Vj.
Each investor desiring portfolio insurance who is certain that
the volatility is V, will be indifferent between the
appropriate dynamic hedging strategy and holding the option at a
price of Q1. However, if the investor is even slightly
uncertain about his ability to execute the appropriate dynamic
hedging strategy then he will prefer the option. The number of
people who prefer the option will be proportional to the number
of investors who desire portfolio insurance strategies.This
will cause the price of the option to reveal the intensity of
investor desire for portfolio insurance,—25—
market timers have no way to forecast the extent to which their
capital is in demand. This is because the option price will
inform market timers about the profitability of committing their
capital to volatility reducing trades at date 2. A high option
price is suggestive of high date 2 price volatility, which is
suggestive of a high expected return from committing capital to
market making activity at date 2.
4C. EXTENT OF ADOPTION OF DYNAMIC HEDGING STRATEGIES IS UNKNOWN.
NOREAL PUT OPTIONS ARE TRADED AT DATE 1.
This is a situation where price signals about the extent of
adoption of portfolio insurance strategies are absent, or arrive
too late.18 At date 1, market timers must make capital
commitments based upon incomplete information, and investors
choose dynamic hedging strategies under incomplete information.
As a consequence, a put option will no longer be a redundant
security, i.e., it can be impossible to replicate its payoff
using a dynamic hedging strategy because the stock volatility is
unknown.
If investors continue to use portfolio insurance strategies
18assume that the date 1 price of the stock index does
not reveal the intensity of date 1 adoptions.Date 1 is
supposed to be the date at which market timers must make capital
commitments to attempt to profit from date 2 price volatility
caused by date 1 adoptions. If the price is already varying at
date 1 from its normal level because of adoptions, then the
dates should be relabelled and we should start the analysis at
an earlier date. In general as described in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976), •there will be "noise" in the stock price which
will prevent it from completely revealing such information.—26—
in the presence of uncertain volatility, then notonly will
volatility be uncertain but it will be larger than it would
otherwise have been.Recall that the capital commitments of
market timers serve to reduce volatility.In particular if
option price or other information reveals the extent of
portfolio insurance usage f, then in times of high usage, they
commit more capital. That is, capital commitments can be
tailored to the anticipated volatility caused by adoption of
portfolio insurance strategies. The inability to tailor capital
commitments will reduce the average gain from such market timing
investments. Therefore average volatility can rise, and be
accompanied by a fall in market timing capital commitments.
The above remarks can be better understood by the following
example. Suppose 50% of the time no investors pursue portfolio
insurance strategies at date 1, while the other 50% of the time
most of the investors use portfolio insurance.(This is just a
method for describing the uncertainty market timers have about
adoption.) At date 1, the market timers do not know which type
of situation they are facing. If no investors are using
portfolio insurance strategies, then date 2 price volatility
will be very low, and the benefits from date 1 capital
commitment to market timing will be low.The situation is
reversed if many investors are using portfolio insurance
strategies, If market timers knew which situation they were in,
then they would commit capital where appropriate, and actual
volatility will be low,Lacking information about adoption,—27—
however, they commit an taverageu amount of capital which is
correct for the "average' situation.As a consequence when
adoption is low, their capital is unnecessary, and when adoption
is high their capital is inadequate to prevent excessive date 2
price volatility.
It should be emphasized that in a continuous time version
of this model, market participants will discover information
about the intensity of portfolio insurance usage by observing
realized stock price volatility.If stock price volatility is
variable only because insurance adoption is variable, then
realized volatility will be a very good signal for adoption
intensity. Further, if adoption intensity changes slowly
relative to the rate at which new information about fundamentals
arrives, then market timers will be able to commit capital in
response to observed changes in realized volatility in such a
way that "excessive" volatility is reduced.5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The theoretical perspectives developed herein show that a
synthetic security puts quite different informational burdens on
market participants than a real security.If an investor
chooses a dynamic trading strategy to synthesize a European put
option, then he should be very concerned with the number of
other investors who have chosen similar strategies. He may very
well find his own strategy infeasible if a substantial number of
other traders are using the same strategy. Even if his strategy
is feasible, it may cost far more than anticipated.On the
other hand if an investor could buy a real European option with
the desired strike price and expiration day, then the price of
the option would reveal the cost of the trading strategy. He
would not have to know what other traders are doing in order to
know whether his strategy is feasible,
The above informational role of prices occurs in many
contexts. Hayek (1945) wrote:
"We must look at the price system as •..amechanism for
communicating information if we want to understand its real
function ...Themost significant fact about this system is
the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how
little, the individual participants need to know in order to
be able to take the right action ...bya kind of symbol,
only the most essential information is passed on ..."
Ihave shown elsewhere how this view of prices helps illuminate
the informational role of securities markets)-9 Focusing on the
informational role of markets seems especially appropriate in
19 See Grossman (1976).—29—
attempting to forecast the consequences of substituting real
securities for synthetic securities.
I have argued that market timers and other liquidity
providers will find it difficult to engage in stabilizing trades
when they have poor information about the desire for their
services.In the absence of a real options market it will be
difficult to forecast price volatility, and hence difficult to
forecast the effective demand for commitments of capital to
market timing activities. Equally important, portfolio insurers
will not know the cost of their strategies when they do not know
the intensity of which other investors are using similar
strategies. If a substantial number of investors suddenly
decide to use insurance strategies predicated on historical
levels of stock volatility, then this will raise stock and stock
index futures price volatility.
The above theoretical perspective should not be construed
as suggesting that (a) portfolio insurance, or dynamic hedging
strategies are bad, or (b) that the increased use of such
strategies has caused an increase in stock and futures price
volatility.First, dynamic hedging strategies clearly play an
important and useful role in increasing the feasible set of
payoffs available to investors.It is costly (both privately
and socially) to have liquid, real markets in every imaginable
security. Dynamic hedging strategies permit us to economize On
the number of active markets.Second, even if dynamic hedging
strategies have contributed (or will contribute as their-30-
importance grows) to stock price volatility, it does not, follow
that this is, in net, socially harmful, or worthy of regulation.
To say that the use of a strategy imposes costs, hardly implies
that these costs outweigh their benefits.
A more relevant question is: how can the Exchanges reduce
the costs imposed if volatility increases with an increase in
the adoption of dynamic hedging strategies? To answer. this
question, 'recall that the source of the problem is that market
participants lack current information about the future trading
plans of other participants.If miny investors today adopt
portfolio insurance strategies, then this implies that many will
be sellers in the future when prices fall.This creates, a
current opportunity for market timers to 'commit resources, jj
only they were aware of the existina 'plans of other traders.
It hardly seems practical to solve this problem by
suggesting that the Exchanges require all members to publicize
theirplans and the plans of their cástomers. Aside from the
obviousenforcement difficulties, it wouldhave the effect of
forcingthose people who may not be "informationless" portfolio
hedgers to 'reveal their strategies.: .Howcould the Exchanges
distinguishthose investors who, invest resources in the
collection of market timing information, from those traders who
are simply pursuing "informationless" trading for the purpose. of
synthesizing a put option? It. Strely will not, help the
informational efficiency of markets,, if the Exchanges 'force
individuals to reveal (legally obtained) information which they—31—
want to keep secret and which they have expended real resources
to acquire.This would only reduce the amount of information
collected in the first place, and thus inhibit market timing
activities which are volatility reducing.
The maintenance of privacy for those investors who desire
privacy is not a problem for our purposes if the disclosure is
voluntary.An investor whose trades are for the purpose of
synthesizing an option will have no need for secrecy in his
trading plans. This is seen clearly in Kidder Peabody's
"sunshine" trades for the portfolio insurance strategy firm of
Leland, O'Brien Rubinstein Associates.They use preannounced
trading to reveal themselves to be "inforniationless" and to
enhance the number of investors willing to take the other side
of their trades. it is interesting to note that Kidder Peabody
was unable to fully preannourice their trades because of the
possible conflict with Exchange rules against prearranged
trading.
I think that the Exchanges could avoid the problem of
prearranged trading, and also create a system conducive to
voluntary disclosure by the following system.Each Exchange
could set up a system where stop loss and other limited orders
would be sent to a central computer where they are aggregated
and the results made public continuously.For the New York
Stock Exchange a special system is feasible.20With many
20 The NYSErecognizes the need for providing advance
information about future order flow. Its experiments with: (a)
disclosing "market on close" orders prior to the close of—32-'
specialists already using an electronic book', it is feasible
to link the books across stocks and publicly display the size of
the limit orders for various indexes in which there are futures
or options. For example, the aggregate of buy orders could be
computed under the hypothesis that each component in the S&P 500
falls in price by 1%. This can be done by looking at the "book"
for each component stock, finding the number of shares to be
bought on the specialists book if the price for that stock falls
by 1%, and computing the weighted sum across the stocks in the
S&P index. A imilar calculation could be performed for a range
of percentage up moves and down moves of the stocks in the
index.The final result would be a chart indicating the total
buy orders in the specialist books for the index at various
relative price moves in the index.A similar chart could be
constructed for sell orders, Finally, a chart could be
constructed for the net buy (buy minus sell) orders for the
index.
The transmittal of information about size of net buy orders
at prices for the index which are away from the current price
will allow investors to gauge the of the market. If net
sells are very high (due to stop loss orders of portfolio
insurers) at a price just below the current price, then market
timers know that there will be opportunities for advantageous
trades.They will have time to raise the capital (or contact
trading, and (b) disclosing order imbalances prior to the
opening of trade, are examples of the type of mechanism I am
proposing, and its motivation is similar to mine.—33-.
their own brokerage customers), which will lessen the impact of
the execution of the stop loss orders.
There is another adaptation for the NYSE which would
interact with the above system, and also enhance the execution
of index trades.The Exchange could set up a system by which
there is a limit order (and stop loss order) electronic book in
various stock indexes.For example, members could enter such
orders on the electronic book for the S&P 500 which would
specify that if the index hits a particular level, then for
example, 20 units of the index should be sold. When the index
hit that level the computer would send sell orders for the
components of the index to the specialists posts for execution.
The aggregate positions in the electronic book would be made
public, so that the public would know how many index trades can
be expected to be executed at various index prices. Again, the
dissemination of such information would enhance the
effectiveness of market timing activities, and reduce
volatility.
It is somewhat more difficult to effect similar changes on
futures Exchanges. However, it is crucial to realize that the
index futures and options markets do not exist in a vacuum. If
futures contracts are sold by a portfolio insurer, as a low
(transactions cost) alternative to selling the portfolios
common stock holdings, then this must impact on the cash (i.e.,
stock) market.Index arbitrage will cause the cash prices to
(roughly) stay in line with the futures prices.If the cash*34 —
marketis illiquid, then the futures market will show an
increase in volatility.
The relevant adaptation for futures markets would be a
system by which brokers could commit themselves to execute
orders at various prices, and the Exchange would aggregate these
commitments and display them on a screen to various interested
parties.21 To avoid liquidity reducing prearranged trades, the
screen need not even identify the source of the orders.The
Exchange would have to find some method of assuring that brokers
carried out their commitments,It should be noted that the
physical arrangement of most trading pits, and the hectic pace
of activity may make it difficult for a broker to carry out his
commitment.For example, a broker could always claim that he
tried to carry out the commitment, but trading was too hectic.
Some problems of implementation may be alleviated if a
particular part of the trading pit is designated as the place
where brokers with preannounced trades must stand.Of course,
this may create prearrangement abuses.I don't believe that
these problems are insurmountable, however the creation of an
21 This suggestiongoes somewhat beyond current proposals
to enable ttsunshineI trading. Current proposals are concerned
with transmittal of information to market participants regarding
a broker's commitment to execute a trade at some time in the
near future.The purpose of such a proposal is to lower the
market impact to a portfolio insurer for a trade that he has
just decided to make.My proposal is to show the market the
whole schedule of trades, at prices away from the current price
(aggregated over all customers who desire to participate). A
floor trader could look at such a schedule and see that if the
index price falls then there will be heavy selling. This alerts
the floor to the need for more liquidity before heavy se1linci
drives the price down..s35e
electronicdisplay of stop loss and limit orders clearly creates
specialproblems for futures markets •22
Finally, it should be emphasized that the suggested
adaptationsare for a "problem"thatmay not nowexist, and may
neverexist. The implementation of any proposal contained
herein should await careful measurement of the market impact of
synthetic hedging strategies. The purpose of this Section is to
illustrate the potential application of a theoretical
perspective which emphasizes the informational role of markets;
it should not be construed as a practical guide for regulation
or for the modification of Exchange rules.
22 See Miller and Grossman (1986) for a discussion of some
of the differences between futures markets and the NYSE.REFERENCES
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